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Abstract
Focusing on the testable implications on the equilibrium manifold, we show that the
rationalizability problem is NP-complete. Subsequently, we present an integer program-
ming (IP) approach to characterizing general equilibrium models. This approach avoids
the use of the Tarski-Seidenberg algorithm for quantiﬁer elimination that is commonly
used in the literature. The IP approach naturally applies to settings with any number of
observations, which is attractive for empirical applications. In addition, it can easily be ad-
justed to analyze the testable implications of alternative general equilibrium models (that
include, e.g., public goods, externalities and/or production). Further, we show that the IP
framework can easily address recoverability questions (pertaining to the structural model
that underlies the observed equilibrium behavior), and account for empirical issues when
bringing the IP methodology to the data (such as goodness-of-ﬁt and power). Finally, we
show how to develop easy-to-implement heuristics that give a quick (but possibly incon-
clusive) answer to whether or not the data satisfy the general equilibrium models.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C60, D10, D51
Keywords: General equilibrium, equilibrium manifold, exchange economies, production
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1 Motivation
We introduce an integer programming (IP) approach to nonparametrically characterizing gen-
eral equilibrium models. Attractively, this approach naturally deals with any number of ob-
servations and/or agents. We show that we can easily integrate several extensions into our
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1basic model that focus on public goods, externalities and production. In addition, we address
recoverability questions and empirical issues such as power and goodness-of-ﬁt of general equi-
libriummodels. Thispavesthewayfornonparametricanalysisofgeneralequilibriumbehavior
in empirical applications.
The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu result can be summarized in the following way: any real
valued function of prices that satisﬁes Walras’ law, continuity and homogeneity of degree zero
is the excess demand function of some economy with at least as many agents as commodities.
This celebrated result led to the rather depressing viewpoint that general equilibrium is un-
able to generate falsiﬁable predictions. From a Popperian perspective, this would label general
equilibrium theory as unscientiﬁc.
BrownandMatzkin(1996), however, showedthatifwefocusontheequilibriummanifold,1
and not on the excess demand function, then the pure exchange model has strong nonpara-
metric empirical restrictions. Their main results characterize the ﬁnite data sets consisting of
equilibrium prices, aggregate endowments and individual incomes, for which there exist con-
tinuous, concave and non-satiated utility functions such that the observed prices correspond
to some equilibrium price vector for the pure exchange economy associated with the given
endowments. More precisely, these utility functions exist if and only if there exist individual
consumption bundles such that: (i) individual expenditure equals individual income, (ii) indi-
vidual consumption bundles sum to aggregate endowments, and (iii) for each individual there
exist a solution for the corresponding Afriat inequalities. Moreover, they demonstrated that
these restrictions are non-vacuous. If a given data set satisﬁes the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) this
data set is said to be rationalizable.
Requirements(i)and(ii)areexpressedaslinearequalitiesandcanthereforeeasilybeveriﬁed
by linear programming methods. Unfortunately, requirement (iii) has a quadratic form. In
order to circumvent this problem, Brown and Matzkin make use of a deep result from semi-
algebraic theory: the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem. This theorem states that every ﬁrst-order
formula over the real ﬁelds can be reduced to an equivalent quantiﬁer-free formula. Moreover,
this reduction can be established in ﬁnite time. From this, Brown and Matzkin conclude that
it is possible to derive in ﬁnite time whether a solution to (i), (ii) and (iii) exists.
Subsequent research has extended the result to models including production (Carvajal,
2005), Pareto optimal provision of public goods (Snyder, 1999), ﬁnancial markets (Kübler,
2003), random preferences (Carvajal, 2003), Pareto efﬁcient and individual rational allocations
(Bachmann, 2006) and models with interdependent preferences (Deb, 2009).2 The usual ap-
proach adopted in these studies is as follows. First, it is demonstrated that there exist concave,
continuous and non-satiated utility functions that rationalize the data for the economy under
consideration if and only if there exists some set of variables satisfying a certain collection
of polynomial inequalities. Second, it is inferred, making use of the Tarski-Seidenberg theo-
rem on quantiﬁer elimination, that the issue of rationalizability can be resolved in ﬁnite time.
Third, a counterexample is provided, afﬁrming the non-triviality of the collection of derived
1The equilibrium manifold is the set of prices and individual endowments for which the excess demand func-
tion is zero.
2We refer to Carvajal et al. (2004) for an extensive overview of the literature.
2polynomial inequalities.
Although these results clearly demonstrate the conditions for which a given data set can
belong to the equilibrium manifold, most researches remain quite negligent on the issue con-
cerning the practical veriﬁcation of these conditions. Two exceptions are worth mentioning.
Intheiroriginalpaper, BrownandMatzkin(1996)showhowtousetheTarski-Seidenbergalgo-
rithm in order to derive the testable restrictions for general equilibrium models with 2 agents
and 2 observations. Unfortunately, the Tarski-Seidenberg algorithm is, for worst time com-
plexity, at best doubly exponential in the number of quantiﬁers to be eliminated. Hence, it is
computationally very inefﬁcient even for moderate sized problems. A second algorithm was
proposed by Brown and Kannan (2008). This algorithm enumerates every possible preference
ordering of all individuals over the different observations and veriﬁes for each preference pro-
ﬁle —via linear programming techniques— whether these preferences lead to a rationalization.
This algorithm is exponential in both the number of observations and the number of individu-
als. The computational inefﬁciency of these two algorithms raises the question whether there
exist an algorithm that can verify the rationalizability question efﬁciently, i.e. in a polynomial
number of steps. In Section 3, we show that, unless P= NP, the answer is no. In particular,
the veriﬁcation of the empirical restrictions of the Brown and Matzkin characterization is an
NP-complete problem.3 This result implies that one should not try to construct a polynomial
time algorithm that veriﬁes the rationalizability question —unless one has taken up the ambi-
tious task of showing that P= NP. In turn, it gives a strong argument in favor of searching for
a widely applied and ‘efﬁcient’ non-polynomial time algorithm, to verify the rationalizability
conditions and to open the way for introducing heuristics that can give quick (but possible
inconclusive) answers.
By exploiting the equivalence between the existence of Afriat inequalities and the General-
ized Axiom of Revealed Preference,4 we show how to transform condition (iii) of Brown and
Matzkin into a set of linear restrictions with mixed integer variables; i.e. we apply an Integer
Programming (IP) procedure to characterize testable implications of general equilibrium mod-
els. Such an IP approach has proven very useful in the closely related literature of collective
consumption models, which studies the behavior of multi-person households; Chiappori et al.
(2004) cite multi-person household behavior as a prime instance of ‘small group behavior’ that
can be analyzed by using insights from general equilibrium theory. See Cherchye et al. (2007)
and Cherchye et al. (2008) for IP characterizations of collective consumption models.
From a theoretical point of view, our core motivation for adopting an IP approach is that
the IP procedure is a widely accepted and a well known tool to handle NP-complete problems.
Besides this, we also have a number of other motivations for our IP approach. Most notably,
the IP approach allows us to avoid the use of the Tarski-Seidenberg algorithm to eliminate
the quantiﬁers. Although in theory this algorithm can handle data sets with any number of
observations, existing applications in the context of general equilibrium models mostly restrict
their analysis to data sets with only 2 observations (see our above discussion). Moreover, when
using the Tarski-Seidenberg algorithm, the analysis for one general equilibrium model is not
3We refer to Garey and Johnson (1979) for an introduction into the theory of NP-completeness.
4See Section 2 for formal deﬁnitions.
3straightforwardlyextendedtoanothermodel(thataccounts,e.g.,forpublicgoods,externalities
and/or production). Given this, an important argument pro our IP approach is that it provides
a versatile framework for analyzing testable implications of general equilibrium models.5 For
example, in Sections 3 and 4 our characterizations of general equilibrium models ` a la Brown
and Matzkin naturally apply to any number of observations. Next, in Sections 5 and 6 we
presentfairlystraightforwardextensionsofthebasicIPcharacterizationstowardsothergeneral
equilibrium models, and we show how our IP approach can account for empirical issues like
power and goodness of ﬁt.
The fact that the IP characterizations developed in the following sections naturally apply to
any number of observations, makes them particularly attractive for empirical applications. In
this respect, from elementary IP theory, we know that solving integer programs may become
computationally demanding for large data sets. However, for such large data sets we illustrate
the possible use of heuristics that give a quick (but possibly inconclusive) answer to whether
or not the data set satisﬁes the general equilibrium restrictions.
Finally, our results also provide some useful extensions to the literature concerning the
testable implications of household decision making. For example, we propose heuristics that
can also be used in the context of collective consumption models. In addition, our IP character-
izationsofgeneralequilibriummodelswithproduction, canserveasastartingpointtodevelop
IP characterizations of collective consumption models that account for household production
(compare with Chiappori (1997)).
Summarizing, the IP approach that is presented in this paper provides a useful tool for
bringing the testable implications of general equilibrium models to the data. In such applica-
tions, it can be useful to think of different agents of the general equilibrium model as agent
types, representing groups of consumers with the same tastes and incomes; see Brown and
Matzkin (1996) for discussion. Next, Chiappori et al. (2004) claim that general equilibrium
analysis does not only apply to ‘large economies’, but also to ‘small group behavior’ of house-
holds, committees, clubs, villages and other local organization. See also Rizvi (2006), and
Brown and Kannan (2008) for more discussion on meaningful empirical applications of gen-
eral equilibrium models. Finally, Brown and Lee (2008) illustrate that our insights could also
be useful to obtain a more accurate measurement of the social cost of monopoly.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by brieﬂy recapturing Afriat (1967)’s
theorem, which characterizes rationalizable behavior in terms of Afriat inequalities, and by
introducing the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). Section 3 presents the
NP-completeness result, and provides an IP characterization of general equilibrium behavior
in a pure exchange economy with assignable incomes; this is the case that was originally con-
sidered by Brown and Matzkin (1996). Section 4 looks at the more general case that does not
assume fully assignable incomes; the case with partially assignable incomes has not yet been
investigated in the literature on general equilibrium models. This section also illustrates the
construction of quick heuristics that provide sufﬁcient conditions of rationalizability. Section
5 provides IP characterizations for equilibrium models with public goods and externalities.
5See Sethuraman et al. (2003) for a similar argument that motivates integer programming characterizations in
the context of Arrovian social welfare functions.
4Section 6 discusses some further extensions of our IP characterizations: (1) incorporate pro-
duction in the general equilibrium models; (2) address recoverability issues; and (3) account for
empirical issues such as goodness-of-ﬁt and power in applications.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a setting with J goods, and a ﬁnite data set S = fpt,qtgt=1,...T existing of J-
dimensional price vectors pt 2 R
J
++ and J-dimensional quantity vectors qt 2 R
J
+. The fol-
lowing deﬁnition is a standard concept.
Deﬁnition 1. A data set fpt,qtgt=1,...,T is rationalizable by the function u : R
J
+ ! R if for all
t = 1,...,T:
qt 2 arg max
fhpt,qihpt,qtig
u(q).
In what follows, we will mainly focus on the nonparametric Generalized Axiom of Re-
vealed Preferences (GARP); Varian (1982) has shown that GARP is a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for the data set fpt,qtgt=1,...T to be rationalizable.
Deﬁnition 2. The data fpt,qtgt=1,...,T satisﬁes GARP if and only if we can construct relations
R0,R such that
(i) for all t,s 2f1,...,Tg, if hpt,qti hpt,qsi then qt R0 qs;
(ii) for all t,s,u,...,r,v 2f1,...,Tg, if qt R0 qs , qs R0 qu, ..., and qr R0 qv then qt R qv;
(iii) for all t,s 2f1,...,Tg, if qt R qs, then hps,qsi hps,qti.
Condition (i) states that the quantities qt are directly revealed preferred over qs (qt R0 qs) if
qt was chosen when qs was equally attainable (hpt,qti hpt,qsi); qt are strict directly revealed
preferred over qs if the strict inequality holds. Similarly, we will also often state that the indi-
vidual directly revealed prefers observation t over s. Next, condition (ii) imposes transitivity
on the revealed preference relation R. Finally, condition (iii) states that if a consumption bun-
dle qt is revealed preferred to a consumption bundle qs, then qs cannot be more expensive then
qt.
The following well-known theorem by Afriat (1967) states the conditions that a data set
has to satisfy in order to be rationalizable.
Theorem 1. Let S = fpt,qtgt=1,...,T be a set of observations. The following statements are equiva-
lent:
(i) There exist a non-satiated utility function that rationalizes S;
(ii) S satisﬁes GARP;
5(iii) There exist numbers ftgt=1,...,T  0 and ftgt=1,...,T > 0 such that for all t,s 2f1,...,Tg :





(iv) There exist a non-satiated, continuous, concave and monotonic utility function that ratio-
nalizes S.
Condition (ii) recaptures the result of Varian (1982). Condition (iii) provides an equivalent
characterization in terms of the Afriat inequalities, which allow an explicit construction of the
utility levels associated with each observation t (i.e., utility level t for observed quantities
qt). Finally, condition (iv) states that, if the data set is rationalizable by some utility function
u, then it is also rationalizable by a well-behaved (i.e., continuous, monotonic and concave)
utility function.
We end this section by providing a ﬁfth equivalent to the above theorem, i.e. an integer
programming (IP) characterization of GARP. To do so, we introduce the binary variables
xs,t 2f0,1g. Consider then the following set of constraints:
Program (CS.I).
(i) hpt,qti hpt,qsi < xt,s At (t,s = 1,...,T);
(ii) xt,s + xs,v  1+ xt,v (t,s,v = 1,...,T);
(iii) (xt,s  1) As  hps,qti hps,qsi (t,s = 1,...,T).
Where the constants At are given real numbers that satisfy At  hpt,qti for all t 2f1,...,Tg.
The following proposition then states the wanted result; i.e., for a given data set S =
fpt,qtgt=1,...,T, ﬁnding a solution (in terms of the binary variables xs,t) for this CS.I program is
equivalent to S satisfying GARP.
Proposition 1. Let S = fpt,qtgt=1,...,T be a set of observations. The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) S satisﬁes CS.I;
(ii) S satisﬁes GARP.
Proof. Suppose there exists a solution for program CS.I. If qt R0 qs, which follows from
hpt,qti  hpt,qsi, then condition (i) of CS.I implies that xt,s = 1. Next, if qt R qv, which
follows form qt R0 qs, qs R0 qu, ..., and qr R0 qv, then xt,v = 1 by condition (ii) of CS.I. Fi-
nally, if qt R qs, and thus xt,s = 1, then the right hand side of condition (iii) of CS.I must be
positive (i.e. hps,qti hps,qsi). Thus, we can conclude that S satisﬁes GARP.
Suppose then that S satisﬁes GARP and deﬁne xs,t as follows: xs,t = 1 , qs R qt. Let us
show that this is a solution for CS.I. By construction, condition (i) of CS.I is only restrictive if
its left hand side is positive (i.e. hpt,qti hpt,qsi); but then xs,t = 1 and thus rule (i) is satisﬁed.
Condition (ii) of CS.I is met because of the transitivity of R. Finally, again by construction,
condition (iii) is only restrictive if its left hand side is zero (i.e. xt,s = 1); but then rule (iii)
of GARP implies that the right hand side is also non-negative. This shows that we obtained a
solution for CS.I.
6Theorem 1 together with Proposition 1 gives us three distinct ways to verify whether a
given data set S = fpt,qtgt=1,...,T is rationalizable: (i) via the deﬁnition of GARP, (ii) via the
Afriat inequalities and (iii) using CS.I. In what follows, we will compare the efﬁciency of
these different methods for testing whether a given data set is rationalizable for the models in
subsequent sections. Therefore, it is important to discuss them a bit more in detail.
The ﬁrst method was originally suggested by Varian (1982), and therefore we call it the
VARIAN-method. The method consists of three steps, which comply with the three condi-
tions in Deﬁnition 2 of GARP. The ﬁrst step constructs the relation R0 from the data set
S = fpt,qtgt=1,...,T. In particular qt R0qs if and only if hpt,qti  hptqsi. A second step com-
putes the transitive closure of R0, i.e. the relation R . Varian (1982) suggests using Warshall’s
algorithm (Warshall, 1962), which is an efﬁcient algorithm for computing transitive closures.
The third step veriﬁes if for all qs Rqt it is the case that hpt,qti  hpt,qsi. If this is the case,
the data set satisﬁes GARP and is, therefore, rationalizable. Due to its efﬁciency, the VARIAN-
method is very popular in applied work. It will also serve as a valuable tool for developing
quick heuristics when confronted with more elaborated models (see Section 3).
The second method veriﬁes the rationalizability conditions by testing feasibility of the
corresponding Afriat inequalities (i.e. condition (iii) of Theorem 1). These inequalities are
linear in the unknowns i and i (i 2 f1,...,Tg) which implies that their feasibility can be
veriﬁed using elementary linear programming methods. We refer to Afriat (1967) and Diewert
(1973) for discussions of this method. We call it the AFRIAT-method. A big advantage of this
method is that it provides not only an efﬁcient way to verify the rationalizability conditions
but also, via the computed values of i and i, an estimate for the associated utility levels.
The third method veriﬁes the rationalizability conditions via the conditions in CS.I. These
conditions are linear in the unknown binary variables xs,t. Therefore feasibility can be veriﬁed
by standard integer programming (IP) methods (branch and bound, cutting plane, etc.). We
refer to this method as the IP-method. Compared to the other methods, it is very inefﬁcient
and should not be recommended for applied work for the model developed in this section.
However, in contrast to the other two methods, the IP method will be very useful in combi-
nation with the other restrictions of general equilibrium models. This will be discussed in the
next section.
3 Pure exchange economies with assignable incomes
As in the previous section, we assume that there are J goods and T observations, but now we
considerapureexchangeeconomywithN individuals. Eachindividualisendowedwithawell-
behaved utility function. The collection of these utility functions is denoted by fuigi=1,...,N. In
eachperiod t, weendoweachindividual i withanincome I i
t . Aggregateendowmentsinperiod
t are given by a J-dimensional vector "t. The following concepts will be used throughout the
paper.
Deﬁnition 3. For given fuigi=1,...,N and f"tgt=1,...,T, we deﬁne
7(i) fqi









tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is a competitive equilibrium if fqi





ui(q) and pt 2 R
J
++. The prices pt are called the equilibrium prices.
In words, condition (i) states the market clearing condition for each observation t; i.e., the
quantities qi
t allocated to the individuals i must add up to the aggregate endowment "t. Such
an allocation represents a competitive equilibrium if, for given prices pt, each qi
t maximizes
the utility of individual i; see condition (ii).
BrownandMatzkin(1996)startfromobservationsonthesetofequilibriumpricesfptgt=1,...,T,
the set of aggregate endowments f"tgt=1,...,T and a set of individual incomes fI i
t gt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N.
The following deﬁnition extends the earlier rationalizability concept to this general equilib-
rium context.
Deﬁnition 4. A data set S = fpt,I i
t ,"tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is rationalizable if there exist well-behaved
utilityfunctionsfuigi=1,...,N andafeasibleallocationfqi
tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N suchthatforall t = 1,...,T,i =
1,...N:
(i) hpt,qi
ti = I i
t ;
(ii) fpt,qi
tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is a competitive equilibrium.
Compared to Deﬁnition 1, this deﬁnition accounts for N individuals instead of one. Con-
dition (i) imposes the budget constraints implied by the observed individual incomes. Next,
condition (ii) gives the corresponding competitive equilibrium requirement.
The next theorem recaptures the main result of Brown and Matzkin.





t=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is rationalizable if and
only if for all t = 1,...T,i = 1,...,N there exist numbers i
t  0, i


























Requirements (3.1) and (3.2) have been discussed before; requirement (3.3) captures the
corresponding individual Afriat inequalities introduced in Theorem 1.
As indicated above, a main motivation for the IP approach developed in this paper is that
verifying the restrictions in Theorem 2 is an NP-complete problem. Let us start by giv-
ing the suitable decision problem. For any numbers N,J and T 2 N and a data set S =
8fpt,I i
t ,"tgt=1,...,T,i=1,...,T, the problem RATIONALIZABILITY asks whether there exist vectors
fqi
tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N such that conditions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) of Theorem 2 are satisﬁed. The
next theorem provides a formal statement of our result. We refer to the Appendix for the
proof.
Theorem 3. The decision problem RATIONALIZABILITY is NP-complete.
Thus, one should not focus on constructing polynomial time algorithms for testing the
conditions in Theorem 2. By contrast, the result suggests that a more fruitful avenue consists
in developing easy to implement and versatile non-polynomial time algorithms. Further, if
these algorithms become computationally demanding (e.g., in the case of large data sets), it
suggests using heuristics that give a quick (but possibly inconclusive) answer to whether or not
the data satisfy the general equilibrium restrictions. This is exactly the approach that we follow
in this paper. Moreover, it should be noted that for more speciﬁc cases, the rationalizability
problem may allow for polynomial time veriﬁcation.
The starting point of our IP method is given by the result in Proposition 1, which allows
us to reformulate Theorem 2 by using the program CS.I.





t=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is rationalizable if and only if for all t =

















Of course, in light of Proposition 1, we could have replaced condition (3.6) by the require-
ment that for all i: fpt,qi
tgt=1,...,T satisﬁes GARP.
It would appear that the three methods for solving the rationalizability question that we
discussed in the previous section (i.e. the VARIAN-, AFRIAT- and IP-method) can still be ap-
plied in this setting. However, this is not true. First of all, the VARIAN-method is no longer
feasible. Indeed, as we no longer observe the quantities qi
t, we are no longer able to construct
the revealed preference relation R0, which is needed in order to use Warshall’s algorithm. Sec-
ond, concerning the AFRIAT-method, observe that the Afriat inequalities in requirement (3.3)
are quadratic since we have no observations on either i
s or qi
t. This turns the AFRIAT-method
into verifying the feasibility for a set of quadratic inequalities, a problem that could be solved
by using techniques for solving linear programs with quadratic constraints (LPQC).
The only approach that remains intact is the IP-method. Indeed, the inequalities in CS.I
remains linear even if the quantities qi
t are unobserved. Further, as is well known, IP problems
can be solved more efﬁciently than LPQC problems.6 This makes the IP-method the most
preferred solution method for the model in this section.
6By adding for any binary variable x, the constraints 0  x  1 and x2 = x we can easily convert any IP
problem into a corresponding LPQC problem.
9From elementary IP theory, we know that we can always verify in ﬁnite time whether
a given IP problem is feasible. However, it is well-known that solving an IP problem may
become computationally hard if the number of binary variables gets large. For such large
problems one can always build further on Proposition 2 to derive heuristics that quickly (but
possibly inconclusively) answer whether or not the data at hand satisfy the IP restrictions. For
example, such an easy-to-implement heuristic uses elementary linear programming methods
to verify whether there exists consumption bundles qi
t that solve the linear equalities (3.4)
and (3.5) and the linear relaxation of CS.I. More reﬁned heuristics can explicitly incorporate
additional restrictions of the CS.I program. In the next section we present some heuristics that
apply to a variant of the model in this section.
4 Pure exchange economies without fully assignable incomes
An important restriction on the model in the previous section is the requirement that all in-
dividual incomes are observed. In reality, data sets often only capture (at best) partial infor-
mation on the individual incomes. For example, lower income bounds can be deﬁned on the
basis of minimum income regulations (e.g., minimum wages) or because only labor income
(and not capital income) is observed. In an extreme scenario, there is no information at all on
the income distribution; e.g., this is the usual assumption in collective consumption models.
In this section, we investigate the testable implications of an exchange model with less than
perfect information on the individual incomes (i.e., with only information on bounds of the
individual incomes). We also provide some quick heuristics that provide sufﬁcient conditions
for rationalizability.
We ﬁrst introduce some additional notation. The real valued variables hi
t,l i
t 2 R+ denote,
respectively, upper and lower bounds on the income of individual i in period t. The associated
notion of rationalizability is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 5. A data set fpt,hi
t,l i
t ,"tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is rationalizable if there exist well-behaved
utilityfunctionsfuigi=1,...,N andafeasibleallocationfqi







tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is a competitive equilibrium.
The interpretation is similar to the one of Deﬁnition 4. The main difference is that we no
longer fully observe the individual incomes; and, thus, condition (i) incorporates the income
bounds information that is available. The following proposition provides a straightforward
extension of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. A data set fpt,hi
t,l i
t ,"tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is rationalizable if and only if for all t =


















tgt=1,...,T satisﬁes CS.I. (4.3)
Example 1 below shows that the condition in Proposition 3 can be rejected as soon as we
have two goods and two observations with strictly positive lower bounds on the income of one
individual.7 Given that we do not assume fully assignable incomes, this conclusion generalizes
the result of Brown and Matzkin (1996); these authors have shown refutability of the condition
in Theorem 2 for two observations and two goods in the case of fully assignable incomes.
Example 1. For all T,N and J with T,J  2, and real numbers l i
t > 0, l i
v > 0, there ex-
ists a data set fpt,hi
t,l i
































We see that hpt,"ti > l i
t > hpt,"vi and that hpv,"vi > l i
v > hpv,"ti. If the data set is rationaliz-


















Clearly, this implies a violation of the condition in Proposition 3; the GARP condition for
individual i cannot be satisﬁed.
As discussed in the previous section, verifying whether the IP program in Proposition 3 is
feasible can be computationally very demanding. Therefore, we next introduce sufﬁcient con-
ditions for rationalizability that are generally easier to implement than the IP characterization
7Example 1 only uses information on lower income bounds for illustrative purposes. Clearly, examples with
information on upper income bounds can proceed in a readily analogous manner.
11in Proposition 3; their computational complexity depends on the number of observations and
goods. These conditions will also prove useful to design easy-to-implement heuristics.
Letusstartbygivingsomeintuition. Assumethatwedividethesetofagentsf1,...,Nginto
groupsofmoreorlessequalsize(detailswillbeprovidedintheformaltreatmentbelow). Then,
we partition the set of goods and assign to each group of individuals at random an element of
this partition. Finally, we divide the economy wide endowments of the goods assigned to
a certain group equally among its members. Our result then determines the conditions for
which this kind of allocation provides a solution to the rationalizability problem.
In order to formalize our intuition, we start from a data set S = fpt,l i
t ,hi
t,"tgt=1,...,T and
consider a partition P for the set of goods f1,...,Jg. Each element of this partition determines









("t)j if j 2 P
0 if j = 2 P
In words, the partition P allocates every endowment "t such that each quantity ("t)j is fully
assigned to exactly one vector qP
t .
The next result determines sufﬁcient conditions for which the data set S is rationalizable
given the number of individuals N  jP j.8
Proposition 4. Consider a data set S = fpt,hi
t,l i
t ,"tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N and assume that f1,...,Jg has
a partition P such that for all P 2fP g, fpt,qP
t gt=1,...,T satisﬁes GARP.














Recall that [x] denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
Proof. Consider the set of individuals f1,...Ng and let  : f1,...,Ng ! P be a surjection
from the set of individuals to the partition. For P 2 P , we denote by j 1(P)j the cardinality
of the set f(i) = Pg. By deﬁnition of , we may assume that the surjection  is such that
 1  j 1(P)j   for all P 2P .









8Recall that jP j denotes the cardinality of P .
























Finally given that fpt,qP
t gt=1,...,T satisﬁes GARP, we have that the fpt,qi
tgt=1,...,T satisﬁes GARP
for all i. As such we obtain that there must exist a solution for Proposition 3.
For a given data set fpt,"tgt=1,...,T, the collection of partitions P can be constructed in
ﬁnite time. Moreover, the GARP condition in Proposition 4 can be checked very efﬁciently by
using the VARIAN-method discussed at the end of Section 2. This implies that, although the
procedure in Proposition 4 may be exponential in the number of goods, J, it is polynomial in
the number of individuals and the number of observations.
TheprocedureinProposition4couldeasilybeadaptedtoallowforgroupsofdifferentsizes
orforpartitionsthatdifferacrossobservations. Forexample, considerasettingwhereweallow
a group of individuals either to consume a subset of goods or nothing at all. Obviously, for
observationswhereconsumptioniszero, thelowerboundonincomealsohastobezero, hence
for simplicity we assume that l i
t = 0 and hi
t = hpt,"ti for all t 2 f1,...,Tg and i 2 f1,...,Ng.
This complies with having no information at all concerning the individual incomes. It also
implies that condition (4.2) is always satisﬁed, so that we can ignore it for the moment. Now





("t)j if (j,t) 2 P
0 if (j,t) = 2 P
The following heuristic is a straightforward variation on Proposition 4.
Proposition 5. Consider a data set fpt,"tgt=1,...,T and a partition P of f1,...,Jgf1,...,Tg.
Assumethatforall P 2P ,thesetfpt,qP
t gt=1,...,T satisﬁes GARP. Then,thedatasetisrationalizable
for all exchange economies with a number of individuals N  jP j.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4 and is left to the reader.
We note that the procedure from Proposition 4 only uses partitions for the set f1,...,Jg,
which imposes extra structure as compared to the partitions in Proposition 5. As such, check-
ing all the GARP conditions for Proposition 5 will be computationally more demanding than
checking these for Proposition 4; in other words, the procedure in Proposition 5 may be ex-
ponential in both the number of goods J and the number of observations T. However, we
point out that the result in Proposition 5 can provide a useful basis for designing even easier
heuristics, which avoid specifying all partitions P of f1,...,Jgf1,...,Tg. To illustrate this
lastpoint, thenextresultrecapturesexistingresultsintheliterature; inparticular, itreproduces
Theorem 3 of Snyder (2004).
Heuristic 1. Let fpt,"tgt=1...,T be given.
131. If N  J then fpt,"tg is rationalizable.
2. If N  T, then fpt,"tg is rationalizable.
Proof. It is sufﬁcient to show that for any case we can construct a partition P such that
fpt,qP
t gt=1,...,T satisﬁes GARP for all P 2 P . For case 1, we consider the partition ffjg 
f1,...,Tgjj = 1,...,Jg. For case 2, we consider the partition ff1,...,Jgftgjt = 1,...,Tg. It
is straightforward to show that all partitions satisfy the requirements of Proposition 5.
Heuristic 1 implies that, if we assume that only prices and aggregate endowments are ob-
servable,thenthenumberofindividualsmustbesmallerthanboththenumberofobservations
and the number of goods (i.e., N < T and N < J) if we want to reject rationalizability. Clearly,
this implication puts serious limitations on the empirical usefulness of equilibrium models
such as, e.g., the one in Proposition 5. Still, at this point it is worth to recall once more the
possibility to analyze small group behavior on the basis of general equilibrium theory; exam-
ple applications concern multi-person household consumption, as repeatedly indicated before,
but also trade between a limited number of countries. For such small group settings, we easily
obtain N < T and N < J. Therefore, all the heuristics developed in this section can also be
included into the list of already existing heuristics for models of small group behavior (e.g.
Deb, 2008; Talla Nobibon et al., 2008).
The following result allows us to quickly ﬁnd a rationalization of data sets that do not
satisfy the conditions of Heuristic 1 (i.e., N < T and N < J).
Heuristic 2. For any k 2 N: if N 
T
k
and any subset of k observations of fpt,"tgt=1...,T satisﬁes
GARP, then fpt,"tg is rationalizable.




each element of this partition contains at most k elements and as such we have that the corre-
sponding sets of prices pt and endowments "t satisfy GARP. A similar argument as in Proposi-
tion 5 then ﬁnishes the proof.
In graph theoretical terms, this heuristic boils down to ﬁnding paths of a given length. As
such, practical applications of the heuristic can use well-established and efﬁcient algorithms in
the literature on graph theory, such as Dijkstra’s algorithm.
5 Economies with public goods and consumption externali-
ties
The IP characterizations in Propositions 2 and 3 allow for fairly straightforward extensions
that imply reﬁnements of the basic general equilibrium model. In this section, we illustrate
the versatility of the proposed IP approach by characterizing general equilibrium models that
14account for public consumption and externalities. The next section provides some additional
extensions.
Two preliminary remarks are in order. Firstly, we assume Pareto optimal allocations. Ad-
mittedly, in the presence of public goods and/or externalities, a feasible allocation may be
Pareto suboptimal. As a matter of fact, this makes it all the more interesting to empirically test
whether the Pareto efﬁciency assumption effectively holds; see also Snyder (1999) for discus-
sion on this Pareto efﬁciency benchmark in models with public goods and externalities. The IP
characterizations described below allow for conducting such efﬁciency tests. Secondly, we will
assume that the public goods and the externalities are all positively evaluated by the individuals
in the economy. Indeed, Snyder (1999) argued that we need this assumption to obtain refutable
models.
To structure our following exposition, we will focus on two extreme cases: the case with
all consumption public; and the case without public consumption, and with all private con-
sumption characterized by externalities. Of course, intermediate cases can be considered in
practical applications. For example, the same good can simultaneously be a private good with
no externality (e.g. a tree in a private garden), an externality generating good (e.g. a tree casting
a shadow on a neighboring garden) and a public good (e.g. a tree in a park). Because we believe
the analogy is fairly easy, we will not explicitly consider these intermediate cases.
Weﬁrstconsiderthecaseinwhichallconsumptionispublic. Inthiscaseweassumethatthe
aggregate endowment of public goods " can be converted to the bundle of public consumption
goods q according to a constant returns to scale production technology. This implies that the
equilibrium price vector, p, must satisfy the restriction
hp,q  "i = 0;
see, for example, Theorem 6 of Varian (1984).
Next, because all consumption is public, the utility function of each individual i can be
written as ui (q). A standard result (see Bergstrom, 1976) is that any Pareto efﬁcient allocation
of publicly consumed goods can be implemented by a set of personalized Lindahl prices pi
t







Given the use of Lindahl prices, we will refer to Lindahl equilibrium instead of competitive
equilibrium in the next rationalizability deﬁnitions. For compactness, we will not include a
formal deﬁnition of the Lindahl equilibrium concept; but this deﬁnition is straightforwardly
similar to Deﬁnition 3 of the competitive equilibrium concept, with Lindahl prices pi
t instead
of observed prices pt. In what follows, we say that fpi
tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is a personalized price
system if the vectors pi
t 2 R
J
++ satisfy the adding up condition (5.1).
Thus, we get the following rationalizability concept, which straightforwardly extends the
deﬁnitions in Section 3.
15Deﬁnition 6. A data set fpt,hi
t,l i
t ,"t,qtgt=1,...,T;i=1,...N is rationalizable if there exist well-behaved
utility functions fuigi=1,...,N and a personalized price system fpi
tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N such that for all





(ii) hpt,qt  "ti = 0, and
(iii) fpi
t,qtgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is a Lindahl equilibrium.
Oncemore, rationalizabilityrequiresconsistencywith GARP conditions(orAfriatinequal-
ities); but now these GARP conditions are expressed in terms of personalized prices. Analogous
reasoning as before obtains the following result.
Proposition 6. A data set fpt,hi
t,l i
t ,"t,qtgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is rationalizable if and only if for all













(iv) 8i : fpi
t,qtgt=1,...,T satisﬁes CS.I.
The interpretation parallels to the one of Proposition 3. Like before, we conclude that
elementary IP methods can verify in ﬁnite time whether a given data set is rationalizable.9
Let us then consider the case in which there is no public consumption and all private con-




. In this case, the treatment of privately consumed quantities is formally similar
to the above treatment of publicly consumed quantities; i.e., Pareto efﬁciency requires Lindahl
pricing. Speciﬁcally, for each quantity vector q
j









t representing the willingness-to-pay of individual i for the consumption of individual
j.






a feasible allocation fQtgt=1,...,T satisﬁes
PN
i=1qi
t = qt with qi
t 2 R
J
+, and a personalized price
system fPi








+. Using this, we obtain the fol-
lowing rationalizability deﬁnition when again assuming a constant returns to scale production
technology.
9It can easily be shown that the Afriat inequalities corresponding to condition (iv) of Proposition 6 are given
by a set of quadratic inequalities. Hence, the IP-method is again deemed more efﬁcient then the AFRIAT-method.
16Deﬁnition 7. A data set fpt,hi
t,l i
t ,"t,qtgt=1,...,T;i=1,...N is rationalizable if there exist well-behaved
utility functions fuigi=1,...,N, a feasible allocation fQtgt=1,...,T and a personalized price system
fPi





(ii) hpt,qt  "ti = 0 and
(iii) fPi
t,Qtgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is a Lindahl equilibrium.
The next result gives the corresponding rationalizability characterization; the argument
proceeds similarly as before.
Proposition 7. A data set fpt,hi
t,l i
t ,"t,qtgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N is rationalizable if and only if for all t =


























(iv) 8i : fPi
t,Qtgt=1,...,T satisﬁes CS.I.
Importantly, the CS.I program in this result is no longer linear in terms of unknowns,
which contrasts with earlier CS.I programs. Speciﬁcally, the program requires that, for all
i = 1,...,N, there exist binary variables fxi



























t  hpt,Qti. This clearly implies non-linearity in prices Pi
t and quantities Qt.10 In order





; yt,s represents the aggregate
value of consumption bundle qs under prices pt, and i
t,s represents the share of this value
allocated to individual i. Consider then the following set of restrictions for each i = 1,...,N:
























s,v  1+ x
i









s,sys,s (t,s = 1,...,T;i = 1,...,N).
Where the constants At are given real numbers that satisfy At  yt,t.
Clearly, these restrictions are linear, and feasibility (i.e., existence of fi
t,sgt,s=1,...T;i=1,...,N
and fxi
t,sgt,s=1,...,T;i=1,...,N that satisfy CS.II) requires that the feasible region of the associated
mixed integer linear program (MILP) is nonempty. Thus, we can verify feasibility in ﬁnite
timebyusingelementaryIPmethods. AdditionalrestrictionsonQt and/or Pi
t canbeincluded
through (linear) restrictions on the i
t,s. Feasibility of CS.II for all i 2 N constitutes a necessary
(but not sufﬁcient) condition for rationalizability in terms of Deﬁnition 7. Speciﬁcally, we
obtain CS.II by substituting yt,s and i
t,s in the CS.I programs that apply to the individuals i (in
Proposition 8); i.e., we use i
t,syt,s instead of hPi




(i) and (ii) of Proposition 7 and, for yt,s = hpt,"si, CS.II is a feasible program in terms of the
variables i
t,s  0 and xi
s,t 2f0,1g for all i 2 N.
It is easily demonstrated that the data set of Example 1 in Section 4 does not satisfy CS.II
together with conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 7, which implies the restrictions are non-
vacuous. In fact, the conditions can be rejected even if there is no information on assignable
incomes. For example, it can be veriﬁed the data set in Example 1 of Cherchye et al. (2007a)
also rejects the conditions of Proposition 8.
6 Further extensions
Three further interesting extensions of the proposed IP characterizations are the following: (1)
include more general production technologies in the general equilibrium model; (2) recover
the structural model that underlies the observed equilibrium behavior; and (3) account for
goodness-of-ﬁt and power of the general equilibrium models in empirical analysis. These ex-
tensions are easily incorporated in the IP framework presented in the previous sections. For
compactness, we abstract from a detailed formal discussion, but restrict to sketching the main
arguments.
181. Production General equilibrium settings often involve not only (utility maximizing) con-
sumers but also (proﬁt maximizing) producers. Therefore, it seems most useful to analyze
the testable implications of general equilibrium models that include production. As indicated
above, this can also be useful within the context of collective consumption models, as it paves
the way for including household production in such settings.
We obtain IP characterizations for general equilibrium in production economies by com-
bining our above results with those of Carvajal (2005). Speciﬁcally, under the technological
assumptions of constant returns to scale and/or ‘no free lunch’, Carvajal derived refutable ra-
tionalizability conditions that only require data on aggregate production (i.e., without the ob-
servation of individual production levels). Interestingly, these testable conditions merely add
linear production-type restrictions to the consumption-type (GARP) conditions considered be-
fore. As such, we can simply add them to our earlier IP characterizations (e.g., in Propositions
2 and 3) without interfering with the MILP structure of the resulting restrictions. See also
Section 5, which considers constant returns to scale production technologies in the IP charac-
terizations.
2. Recoverability In many cases, testing whether a data set satisﬁes the restrictions of some
behavioral (in casu general equilibrium) model only constitutes a ﬁrst step in the empirical
analysis. The next step wants to recover the structural model that underlies the observed be-
havior; in the context of general equilibrium models, such recovery focuses on reconstructing
the individual preferences and individual quantity bundles from the observed equilibrium be-
havior. Chiapppori et al. (1999), for example, derived identiﬁability/recoverability results for
generalequilibriummodels, whichenablerecoverybystartingfromsomeapriori(parametric)
speciﬁcation of the individual utility functions.
The IP characterizations developed above allow for adopting a so-called ‘revealed prefer-
ence’ approach to address recoverability questions. The distinguishing feature of this approach
is that it only uses the preference information that is revealed by the data; it does not require
a (usually non-veriﬁable) prior speciﬁcation for the utility functions. Typically, this revealed
preference approach does not identify a unique speciﬁcation of preferences from a ﬁnite set of
data (which is different from the (parametric) approach in Chiapppori et al. (1999)); recovery
aims at constructing inner and outer bounds on indifference curves, consumption bundles and
production bundles. See, for example, Afriat (1967), Varian (1982) and Varian (2006) for de-
tailed discussions of revealed preference recoverability; these authors consider the basic setting
with a single consumer, and thus start from the rationalizability concept in Deﬁnition 1.
As for the general equilibrium models considered in this paper, recovery can proceed along
the lines of Cherchye et al. (2007), who focused on collective consumption models (possibly
characterized by public goods and externalities). To give a speciﬁc example, let us consider
recovery of the individual quantities qi
t on the basis of the IP characterizations in Propositions
2 and 3. We recall that checking the IP conditions boils down to verifying whether the cor-
responding MILP restrictions deﬁne a nonempty feasible region. Given this, we can recover
a lower (resp. upper) bound by minimizing (resp. maximizing) qi
t subject to the given MILP
restrictions.
193. Empirical issues: goodness-of-ﬁt and power In view of practical applications, two im-
portant considerations concern (1) the goodness-of-ﬁt of the general equilibrium model when
data do not pass the (‘sharp’) condition for equilibrium behavior that is tested, and (2) the
power of the nonparametric tests in terms of the probability of detecting non-equilibrium or
‘irrational’ behavior. Generally, a fair assessment of behavioral models should complement a
goodness-of-ﬁt analysis with a power analysis: favorable goodness-of-ﬁt results, indicating few
violations of the behavioral restrictions, have little meaning if the behavioral implications have
low power, i.e., optimizing behavior can hardly be rejected. Conveniently, as we will argue,
our IP approach allows for incorporating such considerations.
Firstly, Cherchye et al. (2008) propose two goodness-of-ﬁt measures that can be calculated
by starting from IP characterizations of collective consumption models.11 The ﬁrst measure is
inspired by Varian (1990)’s idea to quantify goodness-of-ﬁt in terms of optimization error; it
canbeinterpretedasameasurefortheeconomicsigniﬁcanceofobservedviolationsofoptimiz-
ing behavior. The second measureis based onVarian (1985)’s ideato quantify goodness-of-ﬁtin
terms of measurement error, and can be interpreted as a measure for the statistical signiﬁcance
of observed violations of optimizing behavior. By using our IP characterizations of general
equilibrium models, it is easy to introduce these measures into the current setting.
Secondly, Bronars (1987) presented a procedure that is speciﬁcally designed for detecting
the probability of ‘irrational’ behavior for Afriat-type tests such as ours; see also Andreoni and
Harbaugh (2006) for a recent review of power assessment tools. We can easily operationalize
these power measures in the context of general equilibrium models on the basis of the IP char-
acterizations presented above. We again refer to Cherchye et al. (2008) for more discussion;
while these authors focus on IP characterizations of collective consumption models, their ar-
guments readily extend to our IP characterizations of general equilibrium models.
Appendix: proof of Theorem 3
A decision problem can be described by an INSTANCE, the inputs, and a QUESTION, which has
either “yes” or “no” as an answer. The general equilibrium rationalizability problem (which
we will call RATIONALIZABILITY can be described as follows:
INSTANCE RATIONALIZABILITY: integers T, N and J, a data set fpt,"t,I i
t gt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N
where the elements pt are strict positive J-dimensional price vectors, the elements "t are non-
negative J-dimensional endowment vectors and the numbers I i
t are non-negative incomes.
QUESTION RATIONALIZABILITY: does there exist a set fqi
tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N of positive J-
dimensional consumption vectors that satisﬁes conditions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) of Theorem 2.
In what follows, we will use that condition (3.3) is equivalent to the condition that for all i:
fpt,qi
tgt=1,...,T satisﬁes GARP (see Theorem 1).
A proof of NP-completeness proceeds in two steps: ﬁrst, one has to demonstrate that the
problem is in NP; and, second, one has to show that it is harder than any other NP problem.
11See also Kübler and Schmedders (2008), who discuss the notion of approximating equilibria, for a conceptu-
ally close approach within the speciﬁc context of (in casu dynamic stochastic) general equilibrium analysis.
20The way to solve the second problem is to show that a known NP-complete problem is poly-
nomial time reducible to the given problem. In particular, a problem P1 is polynomial time
reducible into a problem P2 if (i) there exist a function g which maps every instance of P1 into
an instance of P2 in such a way that a solution I1 is a “yes” for P1 if and only if g(I1) is a “yes”
for P2, and (ii) g(I1) can be constructed in polynomial time.
Given all this, to prove Theorem 3, we start by showing that RATIONALIZABILITY is in
the class NP. Indeed, given a solution fqi
tgt=1,...,T;i=1,...,N that satisﬁes the conditions in Theo-
rem 2, conditions (3.1) and (3.2) are linear equalities and require only polynomial time to be
veriﬁed. Also, condition (3.3) can be veriﬁed in polynomial time by using, for example, Var-
ian’s algorithm for verifying GARP (which uses Warshall’s algorithm to compute the transitive
closure of the revealed preference relation); see Varian (1982) for more discussion.
For the second part of the proof, we need to reduce a known NP-complete problem into an
instanceof RATIONALIZABILITY. Tothisend, weusetheproblemMonotone3-SAT(M3SAT);
see Garey and Johnson (1979) for a discussion of M3SAT.
INSTANCE M3SAT: A set of Boolean variables fx1,...,xng and a set of clauses fc1,...,cmg.
Each clause is composed of exactly three distinct literals and a literal is either equal to a variable
or its negation. The term monotone refers to the restriction that for all clauses, all literals in
this clause are either negated or unnegated.
QUESTION M3SAT: Does there exist an assignment to the Boolean variables such that each
clause contains at least one true literal? If the answer is “yes” we say that M3SAT is satisﬁable.
We say that two clauses in an M3SAT instance are of opposite signature if one of the two
clauses only contains literals that are unnegated and the other clause only contains literals that
are negated.
Step 1: construction of the RATIONALIZABILITY instance
Consideraninstanceof M3SAT withasetofvariablesfx1,...,xngandasetofclausesfc1,...,cmg.
First we create the set of individuals, the set of observations and the set of goods.
 For each variable xi 2 fx1,...,xng we create an individual i and these are the only indi-
viduals in our economy. This gives us n individuals (i.e. N = n).
 For each clause c 2 fc1,...,cmg, we create two observations tc and vc and these are the
only observations in the data set. This gives us 2m observations (i.e. T = 2m).
 For each clause c, we create a good denoted by g(tc,vc). For every pair of clauses c and
d of opposite signature, we create two goods g(vc,td) and g(vd,tc) and these are the
only goods in our economy. Let G be the set of goods. The cardinality of G is at most
m + m(m  1) (i.e. J  m + m(m  1)).
Before we provide the values of the prices, aggregate endowments and income levels, we
partition for each observation the set of goods, G, into ﬁve groups. For each clause c and the
corresponding observations tc and vc, we deﬁne:
21 S(tc) = fg(tc,vc)g = S(vc),
 S0(tc) = fg(td,vd) 2 Gj d 6= cg = S0(vc),
 O(tc) = fg(vd,tc) 2 Gj d 6= cg and O(vc) = fg(vc,td) 2 Gjd 6= cg.
 O2(tc) = fg(vd,te) 2 Gj g(vd,tc) 2 O(tc), g(vd,te) 2 O(vd)g O(tc) and
O2(vc) = fg(ve,td) 2 Gj g(vc,td) 2 O(vc), g(ve,td) 2 O(td)g O(vc),
 E(tc) contains all goods in G which are not accounted for in S(tc),S0(tc),O(tc) or O2(tc)
and E(vc) contains all goods in G which are not accounted for in S(vc),S0(vc),O(vc) or
O2(vc).
Clearly, the above sets have by construction an nonempty intersection and constitute for a
givenobservationacorrespondingpartitionofthesetG. ThesetsS(tc),S(vc),S0(tc),S0(vc),E(tc)
and E(vc) are self explanatory. A good g(vd,tc) is in O(tc) and O(vc) if d and c are opposite
clauses. A good g(vd,te) is in O2(tc) if c and d are opposite clauses and at the same time e and
d are also opposite clauses; to have an empty intersection with O(tc) we demand that e is not
equal to c. A similar interpretation holds for a good g(ve,td) in O2(vc).
For each observation we deﬁne the prices, p, and the endowments, ", of the goods by using
the set of goods that contains the given goods. These p and " are given in Table 1 below (prices
are between brackets).
Table 1: Endowments and prices
S(tc) S0(tc) O(tc) O2(tc) E(tc)
tc 1 (1) 6 (2) 1=3  (2) 1=3 (2) 3 (3)
S(vc) S0(vc) O(vc) O2(vc) E(vc)
vc 1  () 6 (2) 1 (1=) 3 (2) 3 (3)
For example, a good in the set S(tc) has for observation tc a price equal to 1 and an endow-
ment also equal to 1. For observation vc the same good (which is in set S(vc)) has price  and
endowment 1 . We assume that  > 0 is a small but strict positive number.
Next, wealsoneedtodeterminetheincomesforeachindividualinagivenobservation. For
each clause c we have exactly three variables xi that are contained in a literal of c. The three
individuals associated to these variables are the only individuals who have a strict positive
income in the the observations tc and vc. That is, we set I i
tc = ptc"tc=3 and I i
vc = pvc"vc=3
for each i for which xi is in a literal of clause c; we set I i
tc = 0 and I i
vc = 0 for all the other
individuals. By construction we considered all observations and, as such, we determined all
the individual incomes.
22Finally, it is clear that the above construction of the sets of individuals, observations and
goods, and the assignment of prices, endowments and incomes can be completed in a polyno-
mial number of steps.
Step 2: M3SAT is satisﬁable if the associated BMC-V problem is a “yes”
instance
We will need the following two lemmas to prove the result.
Lemma 1. For each pair of observations tc and vc (corresponding to a clause c), we have that if
 > 0 is small enough, then ptc("tc  "vc) > 0.
Proof. In order to show the required inequality, we construct Table 2 where each row or col-
umn corresponds with a class of goods for the observations vc or tc.
Table 2: Differences in expenditures for the different classes of goods
S(tc) S0(tc) O(tc) O2(tc) E(tc)
S(vc)  = = = =
S0(vc) = 0 = = =
O(vc) = = = = 3(2)
O2(vc) = = = = 0
E(vc) = = 2( 8=3 ) 2( 8=3) 0
The entries in the table give the difference in expenditures at price level ptc for the good
common to both the row and column class. By construction, S(tc) only has goods in common
with S(vc), and S0(tc) only with S0(vc). As such we only obtain a difference in expenditures in




only contains the good g(tc,vc) and
for this good we have that the expenditures in tc minus the expenditures in vc (at price level





Next, the group O(vc), again by construction, only has goods in common with E(vc). As
above, one can then compute the difference in expenditures (at price level ptc): 3(3 1).
Thirdly, the group O2(vc) also only has goods in common with E(vc). To see this, assume
on the contrary that g(vd,te) 2 O2(vc)\ O2(tc); the other case is dealt with by construction.
This implies that g(vd,tc) 2 O(tc) and g(vc,te) 2 O(vc). Now, assume w.l.o.g. that c has all
its literals unnegated. This implies that both d and e have all there literals negated. However,
then g(vd,te) is not deﬁned in our list of goods, which is a contradiction. The difference in
expenditures (at price level ptc) for the goods common to O2(vc) and E(vc) is given by 3(3 3).
Finally, the group E(vc) has thus goods in common with O(tc),O2(tc) and E(tc), which leads to
the respective differences in expenditures.
The total difference of expenditures, ptc("tc   "vc), is of course given by summing for all





dominates the expression ptc("tc  "vc). This value is strict positive since
 > 0.
Lemma 2. For each pair of observations vc and td (corresponding to clauses c and d of opposite
signature) we have that if  > 0 is small enough, then pvc("vc=3 "td) > 0.
Proof. As similar reasoning as in Lemma 1 leads to Table 3. In this case, if  approaches
Table 3: Differences in expenditures for the different classes of goods
S(vc) S0(vc) O(vc) O2(vc) E(vc)
S(td) = 2(1) = = =
S0(td) ( 17=3 =3) 2( 4) = = =
O(td) = = (1=)() 2(2=3+) =
O2(td) = = 0 2(2=3) 3(2=3)
E(td) = = = 2( 2) 3( 2)




. Again this is strictly
positive.
Now we are ready to show that M3SAT is satisﬁable if the associated RATIONALIZABILITY
problem is a “yes” instance. Consider an instance where the RATIONALIZABILITY answer is
“yes”. Set the value of the variables xi such that for each literal in a clause c the value of this
literal is equal to one if individual i directly revealed prefers tc to vc. Assign arbitrary values to
all variables that are not determined in this way.
Lemma 1 guarantees that the RATIONALIZABILITY answer is “yes” only if for each clause
c there is an individual i, with strict positive income, such that the individual directly revealed
prefers tc to vc. Indeed, the available income for observation tc is equally split over the 3
individuals linked to clause c; Lemma 1 then implies that for all decompositions of "vc, we
always have that at least one of these three individuals directly revealed prefers observation tc
over vc. Hence each clause contains at least one literal with a value equal to one.
So the only thing remaining in order to show that M3SAT is satisﬁable, is to verify that two
opposing literals can not have the value one at the same time. Assume on the contrary that c
containsaliteralofvariable xi and d containstheoppositeliteralofthesamevariable xi; thatis,
we assume that individual i directly reveals prefers tc to vc and td to vd. A similar reasoning as
above shows that Lemma 2 implies that this individual i also strict directly revealed prefers vc
over td andsimilarly vd over tc. Assuchweobtainforindividual i therevealedpreferencecycle
(tc,vc), (vc,td), (td,vd), (vd,tc), which violates GARP since we have a cycle with strict direct
revealed preferred relations. This gives us the desired contradiction and thus we conclude that
M3SAT is satisﬁable.
24Step 3: if the M3SAT is satisﬁable, the associated RATIONALIZABILITY
problem is a “yes” instance
To see the reverse, we need to verify that for each satisﬁable instance of M3SAT we can ﬁnd a
“yes” instance to the associated RATIONALIZABILITY problem. In order to do this, we need
to specify, for a given an solution of M3SAT the consumption bundles qi
t for each individual i
and observation t in such a way that the conditions in Theorem 2 are satisﬁed.
Consider a satisﬁable instance of M3SAT and for each clause, pick exactly one literal which
has the value one; for an individual i and a clause c, we say i 2 I(c) if this literal corresponds
to the variable xi. We determine the consumption bundles according to whether i is in I(c) or
not. In the assignment given in Table 4 below, we only mention individuals with strict positive
income, since the consumption for individuals with zero income must of course be zero for
every good. Table 4 provides consumption bundles depending on the observation and the type
of good. Further, for each clause c we pick one good out of S0(vc) and we call this good g(vc);
this good will play a role in the proof of Fact 4. The prices are recalled between brackets.
Table 4: Consumption bundles for individuals with strict positive income
i 2 I(c)
S(tc) g(vc) S0(tc) fg(vc)g O(tc) O2(tc) E(tc)
tc 1=3 (1) 2 (2) 2 (2) 1=9 =3 (2) 1=9 (2) 1 (3)
S(vc) g(vc) S0(vc) fg(vc)g O(vc) O2(vc) E(vc)
vc 1=3 3 () 14=3 (2) 2 (2) 1=3 (1=) 1 (2) 1 (3)
j = 2 I(c)
S(tc) g(vc) S0(tc) fg(vc)g O(tc) O2(tc) E(tc)
tc 1=3 (1) 2 (2) 2 (2) 1=9 =3 (2) 1=9 (2) 1 (3)
S(vc) g(vc) S0(vc) fg(vc)g O(vc) O2(vc) E(vc)
vc 1=3+ () 2=3 (2) 2 (2) 1=3 (1=) 1 (2) 1 (3)
Oncecaneasilyverifythatthesumoftheaboveconsumptionbundlesisindeedequaltothe
speciﬁed aggregate endowments in 1. Moreover the above speciﬁcation is also compatible with
our speciﬁcation of the individual incomes (see Step 1). This shows that these bundles satisfy
the ﬁrst two conditions of Theorem 2. To verify the third condition, we need to establish the
revealed preference relations for all individuals i.
25Fact 1. For all individuals i 2 I(c), if  > 0 is sufﬁciently small, then we have that i strict directly
revealed prefers observation tc to observation vc.
Proof. Given that I i
tc = ptc"tc=3, we need to show that ptc("tc=3   qi
vc) > 0. Table 5 is con-
structed as before.
Table 5: Difference in expenditures
S(tc) S0(tc) O(tc) O2(tc) E(tc)
S(vc) 3 = = = =
g(vc) = 2( 8=3) = = =
S0(vc) fg(vc)g = 0 = = =
O(vc) = = = = 3(2=3)
O2(vc) = = = = 0
E(vc) = = 2( 8=9 =3) 2( 8=9) 0




dominates and this value is strictly
positive.
Fact 2. Assume clauses c and d have opposite signature. For all individuals i with positive income
in vc, we have that if  > 0 is sufﬁciently small, i strict directly revealed prefers observation vc to
observation td.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 2 since I i
vc = pvc"vc=3.
Fact 3. For all individuals i with strict positive income in observation tc (or vc), then if  > 0
is sufﬁciently small, we have that i strict directly revealed prefers observation tc (or vc) to any
observation where i has zero income.
Proof. Straightforward.
Fact 4. For all individuals i, if  > 0 is sufﬁciently small, we have that i has no strict directly
revealed preference comparisons besides those mentioned by Facts 1, 2 and 3.
Proof. To prove this, we need to consider every possible comparison between two situations
not mentioned in the previous facts. This is a long derivation which is similar to the ones we
made before. Therefore, we leave it for the end of this Appendix.
We can use these facts to show that every individual satisﬁes GARP, given that  > 0 is
sufﬁciently small. Suppose by contradiction that GARP is violated for individual i. This im-
plies that i must have a revealed preference cycle containing at least one strict direct revealed
strict preference comparison. Such a cycle cannot contain observations where i has zero in-
come, since such observations cannot be revealed preferred to observations with strict positive
26income. Further, it is impossible that the cycle only contains elements vc for some clauses c,
because Fact 4 implies that none of the observations vc are revealed preferred to each other. As
such, there must be a clause c such that the revealed preference cycle contains the element tc.
If the literal associated with xi in c is zero,then i 62 I(c) and Fact 4 implies tc is not revealed
preferred to any other observations where i has positive income. Hence, the literal associated
with xi in c must be equal to one.
Further, Fact 2 and 4 show that the only observations that can be strictly revealed preferred
to tc by i is an observation vd where d and c have opposite signature. Also, as i has positive
income in vd, it must by construction be that d contains a literal associated with the variable
xi. Fact 4 implies that the only observation that can dominate vd is the observation td and by
Fact 1 this only holds if i 2 I(c), that is the literal associated with xi equals one.
As such we obtain that both literals in clauses c and d associated with the variable xi must be
equal to one. This is a contradiction with the fact that c and d have opposite signature. Using
the equivalence between GARP and the Afriat inequalities (Theorem 1), we therefore obtain
that all the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisﬁed. Hence, we can conclude that RATIONALIZ-
ABILITY is a “yes”instance.
Proof of Fact 4
Fact 3 implies that we only need to consider the pair of observations where in both observa-
tions we have a common individual with positive income. We have the following 13 restric-
tions that need to be satisﬁed to show that all strict direct revealed preference relations for
individual i are captured by the ﬁrst three facts. (We recall that the strict positive incomes are
given by I i





(b) for j = 2 I(c) : ptc("tc=3 q j
vc) < 0 .
 clause c and d have opposite signature
(c) for i 2 I(c) ptd("td=3 qi
vc) < 0.




(f) for i 2 I(d) : pvc("vc=3 qi
vd) < 0.
(g) for j = 2 I(d) : pvc("vc=3 q j
vd) < 0.
 clause c and d have the same signature
(h) for pvc("vc=3 qi
td) < 0.
27(i) for i 2 I(d) : pvc("vc=3 qi
vd) < 0.
(j) for j = 2 I(d) : pvc("vc=3 q j
vd) < 0.
(k) for i 2 I(c) : ptd("td=3 qi
vc) < 0.





hold if  is sufﬁciently small.
case a.
pvc("vc=3 "tc=3) < 0
S(vc) S0(vc) O(vc) O2(vc) E(vc)
S(tc) ( =3) = = = =
S0(tc) = 0 = = =
O(tc) = = = = 3(8=9+=3)
O2(tc) = = = = 3(8=9)
E(tc) = = 1=( 2=3) 0 0











j = 2 I(c) : ptc("tc=3 q
j
vc) < 0
S(tc) S0(tc) O(tc) O2(tc) E(tc)
S(vc)   = = = =
g(vc) = 2(4=3) = = =
S0(vc) fg(vc)g = 0 = = =
O(vc) = = = = 3(2=3)
O2(vc) = = = = 0
E(vc) = = 2( 8=9 =3) 2( 8=9) 0






i 2 I(c) : ptd("td=3 q
i
vc) < 0.
S(td) S0(td) O(td) O2(td) E(td)
S(vc) = 2(5=3+3) = = =
g(i,vc)  13=3 2( 8=3) = = =
S0(vc) fg(i,vc)g  5=3 0 = = =
O(vc) = = 2( 2=9 =3) 2( 1=9) =
O2(vc) = = 2( 8=9 =3) 2( 8=9) =













dominates. If S(td) 6= g(vc), we need to put the










j = 2 I(c) : ptd("td=3 q
j
vc) < 0.
S(td) S0(td) O(td) O2(td) E(td)
S(vc) = 2(5=3 ) = = =
g(vc)  1=3 2(4=3) = = =
S0(vc) fg(vc)g  5=3 0 = = =
O(vc) = = 2( 2=9 =3) 2( 2=9) =
O2(vc) = = 2( 8=9 =3) 2( 8=9) =
E(vc) = = = = 0
























S(tc) S0(tc) O(tc) O2(tc) E(tc)
S(td) = 2(5=3) = = =
S0(td)  5=3 0 = = =
O(td) = = = = 3(8=9+=3)
O2(td) = = = = 3(8=9)
E(td) = = 2( 8=9 =3) 2( 8=9) 0






i 2 I(d) : pvc("vc=3 q
i
vd) < 0.
S(vc) S0(vc) O(vc) O2(vc) E(vc)
S(vd) = 2(5=3+3) = = =
g(vd) ( 13=3 =3) 2( 8=3) = = =
S0(vd) fg(vd)g ( 5=3 =3) 0 = = =
O(vd) = = = = 3(2=3)
O2(vd) = = = = 0
E(vd) = = 1=( 2=3) 0 0






j = 2 I(d) : pvc("vc=3 q
j
vd) < 0.
29S(vc) S0(vc) fg(vd)g O(vc) O2(vc) E(vc)
S(vd) = 2(5=3 ) = = =
g(vd) (1=3 =3) 2(4=3) = = =
S0(vd) fg(vd)g ( 5=3 =3) 0 = = =
O(vd) = = = = 3(2=3)
O2(vd) = = = = 0
E(vd) = = 1=( 2=3) 0 0
Again, a distinction has to be made whether g(vd) = S(vc) or not. However, in any case it







S(vc) S0(vc) O(vc) O2(vc) E(vc)
S(td) = 2(5=3) = = =
S0(td) ( 5=3 =3) 0 = = =
O(td) = = = = 3(8=9+=3)
O2(td) = = = = 3(8=9)
E(td) = = 1=( 2=3) 0 0






i 2 I(d) : pvc("vc=3 q
i
vd) < 0.
S(vc) S0(vc) O(vc) O2(vc) E(vc)
S(vd) = 2(5=3+3) = = =
g(vd) ( 13=3 =3) 2( 8=3) = = =
S0(vd) fg(vd)g ( 5=3 =3) 0 = = =
O(vd) = = = 2( 2=3) =
O2(vd) = = 1=( 2=3) 0 =
E(vd) = = = = 0
We can make a distinction between the cases g(vd) 2 S(vc) and g(vd) = 2 S(vc). Anyhow, the






j = 2 I(d) : pvc("vc=3 q
j
vd) < 0.
30S(vc) S0(vc) O(vc) O2(vc) E(vc)
S(vd) = 2(5=3 ) = = =
g(vd) ( 1=3 =3) 2(4=3) = = =
S0(vd) fg(vd)g ( 5=3 =3) 0 = = =
O(vd) = = = 2( 2=3) =
O2(vd) = = 1=( 2=3) 0 =
E(vd) = = = = 0
Again, we can make a distinction between the cases g(vd) 2 S(vc) and g(vd) = 2 S(vc). Any-






i 2 I(c) : ptd("td=3 q
i
vc) < 0.
S(td) S0(td) O(td) O2(td) E(td)
S(vc) = 2(5=3+3) = = =
g(vc)  13=3 2( 8=3) = = =
S0(vc) fg(vc)g  5=3 0 = = =
O(vc) = = = = 3(2=3)
O2(vc) = = = = 0
E(vc) = = 2( 8=9 =3) 2( 8=9) 0
























j = 2 I(c) : ptd("td=3 q
j
vc) < 0.
S(td) S0(td) O(td) O2(td) E(td)
S(vc) = 2(5=3 ) = = =
g(vc)  1=3 2(4=3) = = =
S0(vc) fg(vc)g  5=3 0 = = =
O(vc) = = = = 3(2=3)
O2(vc) = = = = 0
E(vc) = = 2( 8=9 =3) 2( 8=9) 0

























31S(tc) S0(tc) O(tc) O2(tc) E(tc)
S(td) = 2(5=3) = = =
S0(td)  5=3 0 = = =
O(td) = = = 2(=3) =
O2(td) = = 2( =3) 0 =
E(td) = = = = 0
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